Introduction
Gad and K. Petersen highlighted, 'it was not until the 2000's that the concept of securitization became widely used to describe the articles published in international relations journals; this development reflects the increasing popularity of the term and increasing theoretical significance from 2000 onwards'. 4 Notably, some authors focus upon further improvement of the theory, while the others just focus upon the concept of securitization. Recently, 'securitization' has become a catchy word that is sometimes being overused. Sometimes authors apply the securitization concept without any significant meaning behind using it.
Notwithstanding, there is a significant group of authors who attempt to improve the theory itself. They can be grouped into two major categories, firstly, those who attempt to pursue more philosophical, sociological studies getting into meta-theoretical analysis and focusing upon the ontological and epistemological perceptions of securitization (for instance, Balzacq, 2005 Balzacq, , 2011 Balzacq, , 2014 Balzacq, , 2015 Balzacq, , 2016 Croft, 2010 Croft, , 2012 Floyd, 2011; Hansen, 2011; Stritzel, 2007 Stritzel, , 2012 McDonald, 2008) , and secondly, those who prioritize a more practical application of securitization for the case studies and focus upon the distinctive theory-related elements, for instance, democratic peace (Hayes, 2009), legitimacy (Wilhelmsen, 2017; Olesker, 2014 , Floyed, 2011 , legitimacy and authority (Balzaq, 2015) desecuritization of minority (Olesker, 2014) , routinized practices (Bourbeau, 2014) , counter-securitization (Stritzel, Chang, 2015) , positive security (Roe, 2012) , human security (Roe, 2012) , politics of mnemonical security (Malksoo, 2015) , and audience (Côté, 2016; Zimmermann, 2017; Wilhelmsen, 2017) . Obviously, a great variety of analytical directions indicate different analytical preferences. Some authors prioritize positivistic ontology while distinctively focusing on national level securitization process, while the others get deeper into the post-positivistic ontology and discourse analysis of security.
The second wave of securitization studies lays the ground for deeper and more complexed analysis of security, including the newly emerging security studies such as ontological security and theorization of security practices. Moreover, all the above mentioned approaches that represent this wave of securitization can be grouped into three different strands, namely, revisionists (such as Balzacq, Floyed, Stritzel), universalists (Hayes), and ones who distinctively focus upon the practices of the speech act (McDonald) . The first strand of scholars aims to revise the theory in order to produce more analytically operational criteria for successful securitization; another group of scholars focuses upon the theory beyond the West; the third group of scholars analyse how the security speech act and practices of state elite combine to erase the distinction between 'the exception' and 'the normal '. 5 Notwithstanding, the very essence/nature of the securitization theory is quite general and gives a lot of space for interpretation, that is why authors usually adapt/ adjust securitization theory to their distinctive case studies (be it territorial, focused upon particular nation-states or functional, focused upon distinctive security challenges or analytical issues (for instance, security practices, audiences, agency, (de)securitization, legitimization process, etc.)). Evidently, the second wave research brought new impetus and rejuvenated the securitization theory; it also expanded the concept of securitization itself; at the same time, it challenged the securitization theory with a great variety of different and sometimes incommensurable approaches and research designs.
Against the abovementioned background, there are some elements that prevent analysis from further dilution and help retaining the major cornerstones of the analysis. To this end, Thierry Balzacq depicts three main advantages of securitization as an analytical tool 'in recasting securitization as an ideal type. The first is that it improves understanding of the internal coherence of securitization, without which, the concept might be indefinitely stretched out. Second, it enables researchers to gauge the extent to which alternative readings and uses of securitization are commensurable or not. Third, following Max Weber's account, capturing securitization through the lens of ideal type makes it possible to blend interpretative understanding and causal explanation.' 6 In addition to that, a securitization is perceived as complete only if the warning/promise made in the speech act is followed up by a change in relevant behaviour by a relevant agent (the securitizing actor or someone instructed by the same) that is justified by this agent with reference to the declared threat. 7 The perception of an ideal type and the process of securitization itself (speech act, process of justification and changes of security agendas) are the main foundational elements that usually remain accepted by the most of securitization authors.
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Ulrik Pram Gad, Karn Lund Petersen, Concepts of politics in securitization studies, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2011, p. 316-317. 6 Tierry Balzacq, The 'Essence' of securitization: Theory, ideal type, and a sociological science of security, International Relations, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2015, p. 103 .
Identity and process of securitization
The Copenhagen School has greatly contributed to the development of research that introduces identity as a referent object of security policy through the concept of societal security.
8 As B. Buzan, while explaining the process of securitisation, highlighted, 'if by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat, the securitising actor has managed to break free the procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization '. 9 This explanation accurately depicts the essence of the securitization concept as crafted by B. Buzan and O. Waever, and provides the essential elements embedded in their analytical framework, namely, existential threats, state of urgency, securitizing actors, speech acts and adaptation/adjustment of rules and procedures, with a particular focus on national security agendas. National identity is perceived by B. Buzan and O. Waever as closely tied with the securitization process.
For B. Buzan and O. Waever, identity becomes the defining point regarding existential threats for a society, 10 so all major changes in national identity will be reflected in national security agendas and, in particular, they will affect and reflect the set of existential threats. Moreover, collective identity and preservation of major collective values can be explained by the perception of societal security, whereas 'societal insecurity exists when members of a community view a development as posing a threat to their survival as a community'.
11 As Maria Mälksoo creatively paraphrased G. Stein's poem, 12 'existential politics is security politics is identity politics '. 13 Notably, the founders of securitization theory focused upon identity in relation to existential threats, whereas the representatives of the second wave of securitization, usually remain distant from this relationship. Moreover, the role of identity in the context of securitization process has never been comprehensively addressed. McDonald observes that 'by designing a universal framework for the 8 Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol.14, No. 3, 2014 , p. 373. (Buzan et al., 1998 Waever et al., 1993: 21) 9 B. Buzan, O. Waver, J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boudler, co: Lynner Rienner, 1998 , p. 25. 10 (Buzan and Waever, 1997 : 242 in Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014 Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014, p. 373. 12 Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.
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Maria Mälksoo, From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2006, p. 278. designation or construction of threat through speech acts, the Copenhagen School ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors -such as dominant narratives of identity -that condition both patterns of securitization and the broader construction of security.'
14 Evidently, the second wave securitization scholars' attention to identity and its role in securitization process is even more limited if compared with the works of their predecessors.
Interestingly, scholars who are focusing upon philosophical and sociological aspects of securitization tend to ignore identity (for instance, Balzacq, Floyd, Stritzel); the authors pursuing functional or geographical case studies seem to be more flexible with their approaches and sometimes touching upon identity in the context of analysis of the securitization process (Mc Donald, 2008; Hayes, 2009 15 ; Vultee, 2011), also securitization of identity itself (Mälksoo, 2015) or insecuritization of identity (Croft, 2012) and securitization of citizenship through the identity management process (Muller, 2010) . But none of them touch upon identity as a part of the nation-state building process and as a facilitator of change.
Some scholars highlight the significance of analysis level in the context of securitization; for instance, B. Muller 16 and M. Mälksoo 17 focus upon identity at the individual analysis level and connections with societal and nation-state analysis levels by securitization process. The most significant level is societal and its relations with individual and national analysis levels might facilitate the perception of securitization process. R. Olesker defines societal security as being reflected 'in the group's ability to protect its identity as manifested in language, cultural, and religious practices, and group beliefs.' 18 F. Vultee 19 observes securitization as a media process and takes into account the societal as well as national identity impact on the securitization process. F. Vultee, against the backdrop of media studies and securitization, draws some identity-related insights, focused upon relationship Vol. 53, 2009, pp. 977-999. 16 Benjamir J. Muller, (Dis)qualified bodies: securitization, citizenship and 'identity management ', Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2010, pp. 279-294. 17 Maria Mälksoo, 'Memory must be defended': Beyond the politics of mnemonical security, Security Dialogue 2015, Vol. 46, No. 3, 221-237. 18 Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol.14, No. 3, 2014, p. 373 Scholars agree upon significance of identity of the context of legitimization of the securitization process. For instance, M. Mälksoo (2015) , similarly as J. Wilhelmsen (2017 Wilhelmsen ( , 2012 and R. Floyd (2011), touch upon legitimization and legitimacy processes. While M. Mälksoo addresses public remembrances (historical memory), J. Wilhelmsen gets into the legitimization of use of force. The general thrust of the argument underlying this description of the securitization process is in many respects in line with post-structuralist ideas of how policies are constituted by identities and rely on accounts that make sense of them and legitimize them as they are launched (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006) . 21 B. Muller underscores that 'knowledge of one's identity is critical, the question of "authorizing access"'. 22 Similarly, J. Wilhelmsen acknowledges that 'references to identities are necessary to represent and legitimize policies, but at the same time these identities are constituted and reproduced through the formulation of policies.' 23 R. Floyd brings into play the moral, normative argument and highlights 'the moral rightness of securitization is in part a function of the legitimacy of the referent object, and legitimacy in turn is a function of the referent object being conducive to human well-being.' 24 P. Roe underscored the significance of legitimacy in the context of emergency measures, 'the argument has to be framed in such a way as to achieve the level Routledge, 2011, p. 77-93. 21 Julie Wilhelmsen, How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist foundation of securitization theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017, p. 169. 22 Benjamir J. Muller, (Dis)qualified bodies: securitization, citizenship and 'identity management ', Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2010, pp. 279-294. 23 Julie Wilhelmsen, How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist foundation of securitization theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017, p. 169 of resonance required to legitimize emergency measures.' 25 Here, the emergency measures can be tied to existential threats and identity as facilitating the legitimization of emergency measures in the preservation of the core national interests and in response to existential threats. The general thrust of the argument underlying this description of the securitization process is in many respects in line with poststructuralist notions of how policies are co-constituted by identities and rely on accounts that make sense of them and legitimize them as they are launched.
26 J. Wilhelmsen aims at 'broadening the focus of study to how referent object identity and actor-hood are (re-)produced through securitization, and how the putative "audience" contributes to this process.
27 ' Identity is also addressed not only in relation level analysis but also focusing upon securitizing agents and 'taking the level of agent, the investigator using process-tracing could then decide to test, for instance, the effect of the securitizing agent's personal identity on the likely outcome of a securitizing move. This is not out of reach as one may think. In a compelling study, Abdelal et al. 28 have developed the different ways in which identity could be treated as a "variable".' 29 However, despite all the attempts, the conceptualisation and incorporation of identity into securitization analysis models is rather limited, the second wave scholars remain mainly ignorant and restrictive to identity-related issues.
Existential threats and identity
Some authors (as J. Nye) make a distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' security challenges and threats, but the recent trends reveal the strong convergence between the two categories. 'Soft security implicitly assumes that the state is not exposed to existential, in particular, military threats from outside. Semi-soft security is defined as being provided by well-functioning administration, police, customs and border guards. Hard security is mainly of external significance. It is provided by capabilities of a state to deter any external threats to the country and should 25 Paul Roe, Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2004, p. 281. 26 Julie Wilhelmsen, A post-structuralist reading of securitization theory, 2012. Routledge, 2011, p. 50. 29 Tierry Balzacq (ed.), Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Routledge, 2011, p. 50 this fail, to defend the country's territorial integrity successfully. The notion of hard security of course assumes the possibility not necessarily the probability of a serious risk.' 30 Usually, the 'hard' security issues are being prioritized, as they are directly related to the existence/survival of the nation state, maintaining of its sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Notably, a concept of hybrid security, hybrid war and hybrid threats blur the lines not only between war and peace, but also between hard and soft, traditional and transnational/asymmetrical, existential and non-existential security threats.
The perception of existential threats has been incorporated into the securitisation theory by O. Waever and B. Buzan (1998, 1997, 2009) (2011), and others. J. Wilhelmsen introduced few meaningful adjustments to the theory by focusing upon the operationalisation of the existential threat, referent object identity, legitimization certain material practices (such as war), and emergency measures that are enabled in a discourse of existential threat.
30 R. Floyd (2011) focused upon the objectivity of existential threats; she defined objective existential threats as 'the threats to the existence of actors and orders regardless of whether anyone has realized this'.
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B. Buzan, highlighted, 'the invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally, it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats'. 32 Moreover, 'by declaring a moment of existential threat, the authority may take decisive exceptional actions to address that threat'. 33 R. Olesker underscores that security is not an objective or material condition but rather an articulation by elites to reproduce hierarchical conditions that characterize the political system and maintain the current power position'. 34 The case of Lithuania reveals quite an opposite, notably objective existence/emergence of external threats may mobilize and unify all political actors to act together ensuring the preservation and survival of a political system and state-hood itself.
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Julie Wilhelmsen, How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist foundation of securitization theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017, p. 166. 31 R. Floyed, Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2011, p. 430 For securitization to be successful, the targeted audience of the speechact must accept that something is indeed an existential threat, thus requiring exceptional measures to be adopted (Buzan et al., 1998: 17, 31, 34) . 35 In the same vein, Julie Wilhelmsen rightly points out 'based on understanding how policies are produced and legitimized, <…> securitization [is perceived] as a process through which a representation of something as an existential threat becomes dominant at the expense of other representations and uncovering, the changing boundary between this identity and that given to "referent object"'.
36 She also highlights, that "the undertaking of emergency measures against something that is said to be threatening and in defence of the referent object would confirm and reinforce the new identity boundaries that were drawn up and legitimize the undertaking of emergency measures.'
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In addition, Roe defines this stage as the mobilization stage in which the response to the threat is established (Roe, 2008: 620) , 38 but this process is much more than just mobilization; it is about the process of adaptation of the political system (nation state) to the new security realities. Securitization is thus a kind of 'call and response' process: an actor makes a call that something is a matter of 'security', and the audience must then respond with their acceptance of it as such. The argument has to be framed in such a way as to achieve the level of resonance required to legitimize emergency measures. 39 In sum, securitization of existential threats is about continuous adaptation, mobilization and legitimization process, namely, continuous process of change and constant adaptation in reaction to change.
Moreover, not only identity boundaries and legitimization of 'emergency measures' are to be accounted, but also the identity change itself (as a system of national values and norms), and how changing identities might directly affect the securitization process that instigates the adaptation to new realities, changing Ethnicities, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014, p. 374. 39 Paul Roe, Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2004, p. 281 threat perception and even national interests. Similarly, P. Roe notices, that 'the security speech act thus has the power to enable emergency measures and to (re) order socio-political relations (friend/enemy, us/them)', 40 so a speech act is a part of constantly ongoing national identity (re)building process: friend-enemy definition and redefinition. The success of securitization move depends on the ability to specify a threat to a collectively and mobilize a 'we' against a supposedly threatening 'them'.
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'The general presupposition of most of the literature that actors prefer stability to change, which is seen as generating anxieties and therefore best avoided; actors are therefore to reassert established patterns of behaviour, routines and identities, rather than embrace change precisely because of the perceived need and value of maintaining stable self-concepts'. 42 Usually, actors pursuing the peaceful expectation of change, in this context, the perception of existential threats are closely tied with the core values and principles of the nation-state.
Identity is supposed to have an exceptional role when it comes to securitization of existential security threats and threats that in any way can affect the survival of the nation state. In this case, the mobilisation process should be essential, as decision making authorities aim to ensure public support to major changes to national security agendas. 'Us' versus 'them' definition and redefinition is relatively easy when it comes to traditional security challenges as military threats stemming from the state actors, but it is getting more complicated when existential security elements are being undermined by transnational/ asymmetric/ hybrid security challenges.
Securitization of hybrid security threats and sense of existential
Notably, the perception of hybrid war has not yet been addressed, neither by the first wave of securitization scholars nor by the second one. Despite the fact that numerous studies and academic articles have been published to address the concepts of hybrid war, hybrid security and hybrid security threats (for instance, Schroefl, Kaufman, 2014; Dalton, 2017; Chivvis, 2017; Charap, 2015; Galeotti, 2016) . Notably, those studies are limited to the case studies and usually do not provide 40 Paul Roe, Is securitization a 'negative' concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2012, p. 254. 41 Georgios Karyotis, Stratos Patrikios, Religion, securitization and ant-immigration attitudes: the case of Greece, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2010, p. 44 42 Christopher Browning, Pertti Joenniemi, Ontologicl security, self-articulation and the securitization of identity, Cooperation and Coinflictm Vol. 59, No. 1, 2017, p. 31-32. any theoretical background that could help explaining the hybrid security effects and implications to national or regional security. Moreover, the representatives of both waves of the securitization theory also remain ignorant and do not provide any analytical reasoning regarding how hybrid elements might be addressed by the theoretical perspective of securitization. How to study security challenges of hybrid nature and how their securitization could look like?
The concept of hybrid security and warfare is slightly evolving. There might be distinguished several reasons why securitization theory overlooks the concept of hybrid warfare and security challenges. Firstly, it is a relatively new concept, introduced by IR scholars in early 2014, as a result of Russia's actions in Ukraine and Russia's military doctrine and political rhetoric. Secondly, introduction of this concept might undermine the pivotal theoretical assumptions of securitization, as the hybrid nature of the threat might be constantly changing, it might contain several different security threats (for instance, cyber, energy and information threats), so it is hard to perceive what should be securitized, what shouldn't be.
Moreover, in terms of agency, a referent object and subject of the threat is getting more obscure and hardly recognizable, this complicates the ordinary traditional securitization process. Hybrid security threats are related to mixed/ambiguous attribution and mixed origins of the threat, which complicates and slows down the securitization process, in a way leaving a country unprepared to provide an adequate and timely response. Thirdly, securitization scholars might not see hybrid security issues as significant to be addressed theoretically. Scholars might not see any added-value to start theorizing something that has already existed for quite some time, but was called differently, as for instance transnational/asymmetric/new warfare or threats.
Nevertheless, the concept of hybrid war, hybrid threats, and hybrid security has not been addressed by the securitization experts, this article argues that there is an added value to start considering possible theoretical analysis which could expand the analytical capabilities of a theory and identify its ability to reflect the most recent political reality, and explain the widely occurring changes in security perception.
Andersson and Tardy claim that the concept of hybrid threats is neither new nor original in terms of substance or reliance on compound and multifaceted solutions involving conventional and unconventional methods. 45 Hybrid war, hybrid security threats and other catchy and trendy concepts are highly criticised by scholars of International Relation. Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud & Patrick Cullen highlighted the most significant criticism:
'Like many new terms that become widely used, hybrid warfare has received a substantial amount of criticism. Largely because the concept was deduced from looking at the enemy, thus shifting its definition and meaning according to the subject of analysis, hybrid warfare lacks conceptual clarity. It has been attacked for being a catch-all phrase or a buzzword with limited analytical value that does not contain anything distinctly new.'
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Moreover, Andersson and Tardy provide the definition of hybrid threats that are characterised by: ' (1) the combination of conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert actions; (2) the aim of creating ambiguity and confusion on the nature, the origin and the objective of the threat; (3) the ability to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities of the targets; (4) the capacity to keep the level of hostility below the "threshold" of conventional war.' 47 Nevertheless, the inclusion of hybrid into the securitization theory could help to modify the concept of existential threat and the perception of securitization itself, as boundaries between existential and non-existential elements might blur and it is getting harder for securitizing actors to predict which challenge or danger can at a certain point of time turn into the existential threat. Moreover, the major change drivers are usually hardly identifiable and predictable, as well as ambiguous. Hybrid security indicates the limits between internal and external, national and global, object and subject. 
Securitization process in Lithuania
The security threats, risks and dangers are addressed in a number of Lithuanian strategic documents, such as the Basics of National Security of Lithuania, the National Security Strategy, and the Military Strategy. The National Security Strategies (2002, 2005, 2012, 2017) and the Military Strategy (2000, 2004, 2012, 2016) are being consistently reissued to reflect the changing security environment and to adapt the national security and defence system accordingly. The most relevant and dominant threats and challenges can be also observed in the rhetoric of Lithuanian officials. The National Security Strategy and the Military Strategy do not make a distinction between threats, dangers and risks; they are taken as one integral group without separating, defining them, and grouping into certain subcategories (see Table 1 ). All those documents illustrate the continuous securitization process and national adaptation to changing security realities.
The existential threats in Lithuania have been securitized as threats that might undermine the vital interests of Lithuania. Lithuanian National security strategies (from 2002 to 2017, NSS) define the following vital national interests: sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order; civil society, respect for humans and citizen's rights and freedoms, and their protection; peace and welfare in the State. Vital national interests reflect the major principles of national identity. An existential threat to national security of Lithuania would be perceived as a threat that is intended to undermine those vital interests. Notably, the group of vital national interests remain the same since the first NSS has been adopted.
The National Security Strategy (2012) divides the internal and external threats, risks and dangers and makes a certain prioritization act by grouping them into subcategories of primary importance/particular attention and the other threats, risks, and dangers. The list is complex and comprehensive; it addresses a wide range of security threats and challenges (economic, energy security, nuclear safety, cyber-attacks, information security, high emigration rates, and corruption) and clearly prioritizes the non-military, transnational/asymmetric security threats. Whereas, the Military Strategy (2004, 2012, 2016 ) (see Table 1 ) keeps the traditional military security threats in the first place on the security threat priority list. However, as M. Šešelgytė pointed out 'the Lithuanian National Security strategy, the Lithuanian Military Strategy, and the Lithuanian Defence Policy White Paper stated that, in the contemporary security environment, there was an observable decrease of inter-state conflicts and increase of non-traditional threats (terrorism, WMD)'. 48 Traditional military threats, risks and dangers were not securitized and included into national security agendas (namely, NSS) by Lithuanian authorities as security challenges for a long period of time. However, despite the fact that they remained on the top priority list of the Military Strategy, but political attention to military security threats and to national defence system was decreasing; moreover, the funding of military and defence sector from 2004 till 2014 was gradually 48 M.Šešelgytė, Security Culture of Lithuania, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 2005, p. 31. shrinking. For instance, NATO estimated Lithuanian defence spending at 0.8% of GDP in 2013, compared to 1.2% in 2007. Insufficient defence financing was perceived by Lithuanian decision makers (Table 2 , 2012, NSS) as an internal 'threat/ risk/danger to national security'. Parliament adopted the provision in 2012 NSS, but at the same time, the political will to increase the defence spending occurred only after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia's aggression in Ukraine served as a wake-up call to increase the spending and rejuvenate the Lithuanian national defence.
The security priorities as of 2012 were energy security, nuclear safety, information attacks, and cyber-attacks. Interestingly, international terrorism, traditional manifestations of power politics (that could mean military build-ups, intensified military activities, or the closed neighbourhood already ongoing at that time) were not on the priority list and were securitized and categorized as 'the other' threats. The NSS (2002, 2005, 2012 ) and the Military Strategy (2004, 2012) 'state that the contemporary security environment inter-state conflicts are decreasing while non-traditional threats are on the rise, including economic, social, environmental and technological aspects of security'. 49 Those strategies became only partly relevant, as Lithuanian government in addition to non-traditional threats, started paying more attention to possible military threats and challenges. Military threats were securitized as existential ones, which could undermine the vital interests of Lithuania, and national identity served as a facilitating factor during the securitization process.
In 2017, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted a new version of NSS. It aimed to address the new realities in the European security. The Strategy shifted the focus from purely 'soft' security to 'hard' security issues; it also focussed upon the hybrid security elements. Notably, with the newest editions, the NSS was getting closer to the Military Strategy of Lithuania. The securitization process addressed the set of existential hybrid and conventional threats. Obviously, the existential threats and securitization process in this context is bringing NSS and Military Strategies together. This happens in response to the security challenges that correspond with existential threats to vital interests of Lithuania, and as the vital interests of the nation-state are at stake, the national security and national defence systems are getting closer. This leads to closer cooperation and co-ordination between the national defence and security institutions.
The process of change in Lithuanian national security
One year before the 2017 NSS update, the new version of the Military Strategy came out (2016 m.; see Table No .2). It underscores the following challenges and security threats: (1) conventional military threats in relation with the growth of Russia's military power and intention to use it in the future; (2) irregular military formations; (3) regional crises; (4) information attacks; (5) Activities of foreign intelligence services; (6) cyber-attacks; (7) challenges related to energy security; (8) terrorism; (9) natural disasters and industrial accidents. The Military Strategy brings Russia back to the 'other' category and securitizes it as posing a potential military threat to the Lithuanian security. Moreover, the conventional military threats are at the top of the security threat play-list and have stayed there from the very earliest version of the Military Strategy (of 2000). The newest strategy introduces and addresses 'irregular military formations' (as a priority no. 2) as a hybrid warfare element that is currently conceived as that of utmost importance to the national security and defence. The other threats on the list are identical as those in the previous strategy of 2012; they have just been moved one position down the list. The most recent trends in the security environment indicate that it is getting harder to identify the sources of security threats, and to make a clear distinction between internal and external, 'soft' and 'hard', traditional and transnational security threats. The line between war and peace, internal and external, national and transnational is blurring. It is getting more complicated to distinguish, perceive and predict (objectively and subjectively) the emergence of the threat, its nature and possible change; to identify its sources, to assess the possible impacts on the national security, and adequately respond. The threat or challenge to the national security can easily be overviewed, misinterpreted, misconceived by the national security institutions and governments, leaving the state in a security void.
Hybrid threats -'posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives' 51 -are of an asymmetrical nature, complex, hardly predictable and identifiable. 'In many instances, the armed force may employ a variety of capabilities while achieving little actual effect from any of them, for example, an insurgent group may launch cyber-attacks, engage in acts of terrorism, or take part in organized criminal activities.' 50 The negative impact of hybrid security threats is enhanced by the progress in technology, intensified spread of information via social networks that can disseminate the contradicting news, misleading information or disinformation.
Notably, Lithuania's defence and security, as underscored numerous times by decision makers, was facing the challenge of insufficient defence financing for defence for years. In 2014, as a reaction to Russia's aggressive activities in and around Ukraine, increased military build-ups in Kaliningrad region, and military activities close to Lithuanian borders, the Lithuanian Parliamentary Parties committed themselves to increase defence spending and to comprehensively upgrade national defence system. The Parliamentary Agreement on the Strategic Guidelines for the 2014-2020 Foreign, Security and Defence Policies states 'in response to the changing geopolitical and security situation in Europe after Russia's aggression in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, a part of the territory of Ukraine, fulfilment of the commitments of membership of NATO and other international organisations by consistently and annually increasing the allocations for national defence for them to reach 2% of GDP by 2020.' 51 This pledge was instantly followed by the 50 Ch. O. Bowers, Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries, Parametres, 2012, vol.42, no. 4, pp. 39-50, p. 40. 51 An accord between the political parties represented in the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on strategic guidelines for the foreign, security and defence policy of the Republic of Lithuania for 2014 -2020 , Vilnius, 29 March 2014 , available online http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_ r=4030&p_d=146141&p_k=2 (14.3.2016 Governmental decision to update the National Security Strategy to better reflect the existing security threats and challenges as well as to better adapt to the most recent changes in the security environment. The new strategy was expected to provide an updated security threat list, the assessment of security environment as well as 'more specific on a means in reaction to security threats and challenges.'
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The most recent changes and challenges in the European security that resulted in major shifts in the NATO defence and deterrence had a direct impact on Lithuania's organisation of national defence. In 2016, the NATO Summit in Warsaw took a decision to establish an enhanced Forward Presence in three Baltic States and Poland. Namely, 4 battalion sized battle-groups in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The deployment started in early spring 2017, the multinational battle-group that is located in Lithuania is led by Germany as a framework nation. '"In the period of 2017-2018, the battlegroup will be manned by Germany and contributing nations: Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Croatia, and France, in total, roughly 1,200 soldiers.' 53 'The eFP multinational battalion is based in Rukla; it is assigned to and falls under [the] command of the Mechanised Infantry Brigade Iron Wolf of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, and train alongside its soldiers in its military training cycle.' 54 This deployment also served as a significant element of Lithuania's national security and defence, and demonstrated the cohesion of the Alliance.
A new version of the Lithuanian National Security Strategy (NSS) that was adopted in reaction to the current security environment and its changes, the NSS focuses upon the most worrisome security processes and sheds light on the complex nature of security threats and challenges. The new NSS version provides an updated list of threats, dangers and risks to the National Security. It singles out the following: conventional military threats, covert military and intelligence threats, threats to the unity of the Euro-Atlantic community, regional and global instability, terrorism, information threats, cyber threats, economic and energy dependence and economic vulnerability, development of unsafe nuclear energy projects nearby the borders of the Republic of Lithuania, social and regional exclusion, poverty, demographic crisis, corruption, social and regional exclusion, poverty, and crisis of values. The strategy includes conventional military threats that are stemming from the Russian Federation's preparedness and intention to use military force in order to achieve its interests, particularly the military build-up and expansion in a close neighbourhood of the Republic of Lithuania as well as activities that are lacking transparency and demonstrating force along the borders of the Republic of Lithuania and other NATO member-states.' 55 The strategy highlights that 'in the current period, the main threat for the security of the Republic of Lithuania is posed by aggressive actions of the Russian Federation violating the security architecture based on universal rules and principles of international law and peaceful co-existence.'
56
The new version of the Lithuanian National Security Strategy shifts the focus from purely 'soft' security issues to 'hard' security as well as to address the hybrid security elements. The cyber security, information security, and international terrorism are stressed and remain high on the priority list of the strategy. The greatest challenge for the decision-makers is how to address 'the little green men' and hybrid challenges in the context of national security and transfer it to national strategic document with a realistic ambition to prevent it. Whether, when and how it should be moved to the 'existential threat' category, and which institutions should be responsible for this?
Looking back to 2014, Lithuania learned that traditional/military threats stemming from Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine and willingness to use force against its neighbours, calls for boosting the national defence and increasing the prudence and resilience of the society. Lithuanian Parliamentary parties signed 'An Agreement on the Strategic Guidelines for the 2014-2020 Foreign, Security and Defence Policies', the strategic guidelines define (securitize), the existential challenges and threats, provide with possible options for adaptation in the context of new security realities. Guidelines are securitizing Russia as a threat (an existential threat) to national security of Lithuania. This decision was driven by external dynamics, concrete steps taken by Russia that served as a wake-up call for Lithuania's security. Identity-wise, by this speech act (formal, institutionalised speech act), Russia has been brought from the sector 'we' to the sector 'the other'. In this context, one good example of the speech act is an interview by A. Paulauskas, a chairman of the parliamentary National Security and Defence Committee, before the new NSS was adopted, he stressed out: 'In the current version of our National Security Strategy, which was updated in 2012, we expressed confidence in the Russian Federation and we have sought to strengthen ties with it. Today, we can identify this country as the aggressor (we must specifically define our approach to the occupation of the Crimea, escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine), posing a threat to our national security. We need to decide what direction to evolve in our relations with this neighbouring country.' 57 He highlights the intention to move Russia from the 'we' category to 'the other' category, due to Russia's unacceptable behaviour, namely, 'the occupation of the Crimea and escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine'. The new version of National Security Strategy retains this approach.
Naturally, Russia's aggressive posture and military activities in and around Ukraine have been taken into account. The ambition for friendly relations and cooperation with Russia is not very high, and the level of trust has significantly decreased. This shift has already been made in an Agreement on the Strategic Guidelines for the 2014-2020 Foreign, Security and Defence Policies, signed by all Lithuanian Parliament parties in March 2014. The document addresses the security challenges related to Russia's aggression in and around Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, and stresses that Russia's activities are perceived as a challenge to the national security of Lithuania.
58 Similarly, the significant changes came out in 2016, in the updated version of the Military strategy address changes in security environment and mentions, that Russia's actions are diminishing the security of Lithuania. So, all security and defence related institutions acted in synch during this securitization process; this indicated the efficient institutional mobilization process in addressing the security environmental changes and adapting national security agenda in reaction to existential threats.
Evidently, the strategic documents haven't addressed a long list of internal and external threats comprehensively by linking them together and evaluating the security environment. The new 2017 version of NSS attempts to perceive and highlight the interlinkages between different security risk/threats/dangers, but in its own way. The updated version of the document merge together internal and external threats. Notably, some threats are being taken out of the national security agenda (de-securitized), some are being requalified as more significant; for instance, cyber-attacks and information attacks are being called cyber threats and information threats, in a way to expand the concept and to leave more 57 A.Paulauskas: atnaujintoje Nacionalinio Saugumo strategijoje naujos grėsmės ir priemonės joms neutraliuzoti, delfi.lt, 18 Januray 2016, available online http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/politics/apaulauskas-atnaujintoje-nacionalinio-saugumo-strategijoje-naujos-gresmes-ir-priemones-jomsneutralizuoti.d?id=70143694 (14.5.2016) 58 LR Parlamente atstovaujamų politinių partijų susitarimas dėl 2014-2020 Lietuvos užsienio, saugumo ir gynybos politikos strateginių gairių, 2014-03-29, available online: (http://www3.lrs.lt/docs2/ RIGVVKWU. PDF (15.3.2016) space for interpretation. In the 2012 NSS, the term 'attack' was more precisely defined, focused and provided better guidelines to identify the action and develop prevention mechanisms. The attack was qualified as a risk/danger/threat. Now in 2017, the cyber and information threats are leaving more space for interpretation at the implementation level -not only the attacks would be qualified as objects of national insecurity but everything around those concepts as well.
On 27 March 2017, the Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite in an interview to the Foreign Policy said, 'Russia is a threat not only to Lithuania but to the whole region and to all of Europe. We see how Russia is behaving in Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave on our border. There they have deployed nuclear-capable missiles that can reach European capitals. It is not just about the Baltic region anymore.' 59 She also underscored that '[the] Russian aggression threatens not only Ukraine, but also Belarus'. 60 At the Annual State of the Nation Address, the President highlighted, 'today, the democratic world understands very clearly that it is our region where major threats to transatlantic security are accumulating: military build-up in the Kaliningrad enclave, aggressive offensive exercise ZAPAD17, the Astravyets nuclear power plant that has become a geopolitical weapon.' 61 Those speech acts are reflecting the national security agenda and via the identity building process, are ensuring the continuity of existential threat securitization process and at the same time consolidating the national institutions and mobilizing the societal support. They are significant, knowing the fact that the Lithuanian society strongly supports the President, so her interventions are to be regarded as significant speech acts.
Conclusion
Historical overview of national security, national identity and existential values reveals that core national values are equally protected by all the governments (despite the political parties they represent) and national security agencies. Those speech acts and the development of security agendas reflect the attempts to ensure the continuity of existential threat securitization process and at the same time consolidating the national institutions and mobilizing the societal support. Evidently, facing an existential threat, the nation state becomes more than an entity as simply composed of separate political parts, but a unified homogeneous system, willing and able to design the mechanisms that help the nation state to respond to various challenges and threats, and to adapt to the changing political environment. Ensuring national defence, strengthening national security, especially while facing 59
